A threat model in one hour
Four questions
What are we protecting? Customer data, money, availability, reputation. Not everything is worth the same.
From whom? An automated scanner, a random attacker, a competitor, an insider, a breached partner. Each has different capabilities.
Where are the boundaries? Every place data crosses trust zones: browser to server, server to database, system to vendor.
What happens if? Describe three bad scenarios in a line each, and rank by damage and likelihood.
Draw before talking
A simple sketch of the components and the arrows between them reveals more than any discussion. Every arrow is a question: who authenticates whom, what is encrypted, what is logged.
The deliverable
One page with five ranked risks, and one suggested action for each. That's enough to start, and it's already more than most systems have.
Going deeper
Repeat the exercise on every significant architectural change — integrating a new vendor, opening an interface, moving to the cloud. A threat model isn't a one-off document but a habit, and done at design time it's dozens of times cheaper than fixing later.